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NOTES
Of course the argument could be advanced that such treatment of the
municipal debt problem by the court would be an open flaunting of the
constitutional prohibition.7 1 However, such a contention disregards the fact
that from the beginning the amendment as it read was unworkable, 2 and
that the court has indirectly recognized that relief is sometimes necessary. 73
The present confusion in the field is a result of the court's failure to bring
such recognition out into the open.74 A frank statement to that effect would
have prevented subsequent courts, as in the Cerajewski and Rappaport cases,
from ignoring the basic issue involved.
The problem of municipal indebtedness today is neither academic nor
remote. There is little doubt that there will be a continuing need on the
part of local units to evade the 2%o limitation.7 5  It is suggested that the
proposed approach, based upon the real considerations present in a debt
limitation, vill provide both just and certain relief.
SECURITIES
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE AS NOTICE OF LIENS UPON MOTOR VEHICLES
Crissinger, the owner of a motor vehicle, gave to the Community State
Bank a chattel mortgage which was duly filed in the chattel mortgage records.
At the same time the bank took possession of the certificate of title, but subse-
quently returned it to Crissinger for the alleged purpose' of permitting the
the debt limitation of the constitution for all practical purposes is nullified." Rappaport
v. Dept. of Health, 87 N. E.2d 77, 82 (Ind. 1949). See also Cerajewski v. McVey, 225
Ind. 67, 73, 72 N. E.2d 650, 652 (1947).
71. "If within our constitution, as it is, we cannot finance necessary hospital additions
and improvements then we should amend the constitution, not flout it." Young, J. in
Rappaport v. Dept. of Health, 87 N. E.2d 77, 82 (Ind. 1949).
72. See Williams and Nehemkis, Municipal Improvements as Affected by Consti-
tutional Debt Limitations, 37 CoL. L. Rxv. 177, 184 (1937).
73. Otherwise why was the "local improvement" district saved by the majority in the
Rappaport decision?
74. In nearly all of the cases in which evasion was allowed, the court went out of its
way to show that evasion was not taking place.
75. Cottrell, Problem of Local Government Reorganization, 2 WE§SERN POLITICAL
QUARTERLY 599 (Dec. 1949) :
Population in most metropolitan areas is now pressing beyond the
safety margin of the resources available for its support. . . Finances
and facilities of all governments are strained by the problems presented.
The situation is one in which governments are trying to meet demands
for more schools, playgrounds, streets, re reational areas, utilities, and
numerous other services through a two inch pipe when a ten inch main
is required.
1. The Indiana statutes seemingly require an applicant for registration plates to
"present satisfactory evidence" that the applicant has been issued a certificate of title.
IND. STAT. ANN. (Bums Supp. 1949) § 47-2501. As a matter of practice, however, an
applicant for registration plates is not required to produce the certificate of title because,
through its records, the department determines whether or not a certificate has been
issued to him.
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latter to obtain registration plates. Crissinger, however, sold the vehicle and
assigned the certificate of title to Bobb, the defendant buyer, who had no
actual knowledge of the prior lien. In a suit to determine priority of the
parties' rights, the Indiana Appellate Court held that the mortgagee's prior
lien was not defeated because it surrendered temporary possession of the
certificate of title to the owner. The purchaser was charged with constructive
notice of the filed chattel mortgage. Commvunity State Bank v. Crissinger,
89 N. E. 2d 78 (Ind. App. 1949).
The Crissinger case sheds further light on the importance of the title
certificate as a means for imparting notice of security interests in motor
vehicles. The problem is significant because of a possible conflict between
the Chattel Mortgage Act2 and the legislative provisions permitting liens on
motor vehicles to be recorded on the certificate of title when it is originally
issued. 3 But because of apparent legislative oversight, the act does not clearly
provide for a method of recording liens thereon once the certificate has been
issued. This hiatus in the title certificate law was made the basis for the
holding in the instant case, since the lien was taken after the owner had been
issued his certificate of title. But in so holding the court overlooked several
factors which strongly militate against the result reached. The principal
purpose of the title certificate law was the avoidance of illegal transfers of
highly mobile property, as the one here involved.4 Accordingly the Commis-
sioner of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles was given the power to prescribe
the form of the title certificate,5 and this power reasonably includes the
establishment of methods by which subsequent liens are to be shown upon
the certificate of title. Furthermore, the court was unaware of the practice of
the Bureau to re-issue a new certificate showing subsequent liens.' Left un-
2. The Chattel Mortgage Act of 1935 requires chattel mortgages on personal property
to be filed in the county of the residence of the mortgagor, or, if not a resident of the
state, in the county where the property is located. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Supp. 1949)
§ 51-509.
3. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Supp. 1949) § 47-2501.
4. The present language of the Indiana title certificate law relating to liens is, except
for the administrative provisions, substantially in accord with the language of the UNi-
rOR M MOTOR VEHICLE ANTI-THEFT ACT. Compare IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Supp. 1949)§ 47-2501 with UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE ANTI-TIEFT AcT § 6(b), 11 U. L. A. 147(1942). The latter act has been declared obsolete by the Uniform Commissioners. Id.
11 U. L. A. 10 (Supp. 1949). While the Uniform Act was adopted to prevent thefts of
motor vehicles, the act required an endorsement of all liens and encumbrances upon a
transfer of the title, thus indicating an intent to give notice to purchasers not only of
ownership, but liens as well. Cf. Lusk, Effect of Registration and Certificate of Title
Acts on the Ownership of Motor Vehicles, 21 IND. Bus. STUDIES 1, 81 (1941).
5. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Supp. 1949) § 47-2501.
6. An investigation of this departmental practice reveals that the procedure for
recording liens subsequent to the original certificate is effectual, simple and inexpensive.
For example, suppose that E bank wishes to perfect a mortgage on an automobile owned
by M where M holds a subsisting certificate of title. E can have M fill out the assign-
ment on the reverse side of his certificate by using M's name and address as both assignee
NOTES
considered by the court was not only the business practice of bankers and
lenders in preserving their interests by this method,' but also the sound policy
reasons for maintaining a centralized recording system for motor vehicles,
the need of which has been recognized by decision' and legislation9 for many
and assignor. At the same time the encumbrance can be entered in the space provided on
the back of the certificate. The instrument may then be sent to the State House by E
where the transaction is processed and a new certificate issued. Under this process the
name of the new assignee and the encumbrance thus appearing on the old certificate are
photostated on the face of the new certificate, and the old is filed as a part of the record
upon the vehicle under its proper serial number. The new title is then mailed back to any
party designated in the application. Consequently E is thoroughly protected by having
his interest permanently recorded with the Bureau, and by having the certificate mailed
to the bank or M as it is desired. The Bureau of Motor Vehicles justifies this procedure
upon an interpretation of the provision:
The original certificate of title together with all assignments thereof,
and any subsequent reissues thereof, shall be retained by the department
and, appropriately classified and indexed, in such a manner as is most
convenient to trace title to such vehicle described therein. (Italics
supplied)
IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Supp. 1949) § 47-2502. The courts will take judicial notice of
the practical interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency. Cotton v. Common-
wealth Loan Co., 206 Ind. 626, 634, 635, 190 N. E. 853, 856-857 (1934).
7. A spot check of the Bureau's records, and consultation with lending agencies shows
that this procedure has become very common with the lending institutions in the larger
cities.
8. E. g., Nichols v. Bogdo Motors, Inc., 118 Ind. App. 156, 77 N. E. 2d 905 (1948);
Maryland Credit Finance Corp. v. Franklin Credit Finance Corp., 164 Va. 579, 180 S. E.
408 (1935) ; Merchants Rating & Adjusting Co. v. Skaug, 4 Wash. 2d 46, 102 P.2d 227
(1940). Contra: Carolina Discount Corp. v. Landis Motor Co., 190 N. C. 157, 129 S. E.
414 (1925).
9. Many states require liens to be perfected upon the certificate of title and provide
protection to and against purchasers and creditors. E.g., ARIZ. CODE ANN. (1940) § 66-231
(liens upon motor vehicles excluded from other recording provisions) ; CAL. VEHICLE CODE
(Supp. 1949, 1948) §§ 196, 198 (exclusive method of imparting notice of chattel mort-
gage) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1948) § 49-412; id. (Supp. 1949) § 49-414 (exclusive method
of imparting notice of lien) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. (1949) § 53-110 (liens exempted
from requirements of filing elsewhere); NEv. CoMP. LAWS. ANN. (Supp. 1949) §
4435.14a; N. M. STAT. ANN. (1941) § 68-119; OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1949)
§ 6290-9 (lien noted on title certificate by clerk of court) ; PA. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1950)
tit. 75, § 33; TEX. STAT., PENAL CODE (1948) art. 1436-1 § 44; VA. CODE ANN. (1950)
§ 46-71 (recording of liens in any other place shall not be required or have any effect) ;
Wyo. CoMP. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1949) § 60-208 (certificate surrendered to county clerk
who records and notes lien on certificate). In other states the statutes requiring trans-
fers to be made through the certificate of title either fail to provide for recording of liens
on the title, or where permitted or required do not state the effect of such provisions as
imparting notice to third persons. E.g., ARK. DIG. STAT. (1947) § 75-106; COLO. STAT.
ANN. (Supp. 1947) c. 16, § 1; ILL. ANN. STAT. (1950) c. 95%, § 77; N. J. STAT. ANN.
(Supp. 1941) § 10-9, 14; N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1949) § 20-72; N. D. REV. CODE
(1943) § 39-0505; ORE. Comp. LAWS. ANN. (Supp. 1947) § 115-114. Centralized filing
through the medium of the title certificate was tentatively proposed as a Reporter's Draft
of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, but the provision has not yet been incorporated in a
proposed draft. Compare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE Part 8 (May 1949 Draft) with
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Proposed Final Draft, Spring 1950). Congress has pro-
vided for centralized recording of liens upon aircraft. 52 STAT. 1006 (1938), as amended,
54 STAT. 1235 (1940), 49 U. S. C. § 523 (1946) ; 62 STAT. 494 (1948), 49 U. S. C. § 523
(Supp. 1949). In Indiana liens upon railroad rolling stock are filed with the Secretary
of State. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1943 Repl.) § 58-807 (applying to conditional sale).
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years. Assuming the court erred in failing to recognize that a lienholder
has the legal means for perfecting his interest upon the certificate of title and
the records of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, it may be useful to examine the
effect of this new system for imparting notice of security interests in motor
vehicles.
Unfiled chattel mortgage
It sometimes happens that a chattel mortgage is taken as security, but
without filing with the county recorder.' ° In such cases where the chattel
mortgagee perfects his interest upon the certificate of title, it would seem
that he should be fully protected for the reason that subsequent persons deal-
ing with the property are charged with constructive notice of the title and the
public records." This position finds support in the general reliance placed
upon the title by the public. The time and expense of searching the chattel
mortgage records in the larger communities have made those records a source
of little value in title investigation." Furthermore, the Chattel Mortgage Act.
and the certificate of title law should be interpreted together.' 8 The latter con-
cerns a special phase of the whole subject of chattel mortgages on personal
property, thus creating a reasonable inference that the certificate of title law
was. intended to govern the method for imparting constructive notice of the
lienholder's rights in motor vehicles. :4
10. In Indiana an unrecorded mortgage is invalid as against "subsequent mortgagees,
purchasers and/or creditors. . . ." IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Supp. 1949) § 51-504; cf.
Universal Discount Corp. v. Brooks, 115 Ind. App. 591, 58 N. E.2d 369 (1944) (holding
that an unacknowledged mortgage was invalid as against all creditors) ; Maple v. Sea-
board Surety Co., 117 Ind. App. 627, 73 N. E.2d 80 (1947) (but an unrecorded chattel
mortgage is valid between the immediate parties).
11. Cf. Personal Finance Co. v. Flecknoe, 216 Ind. 330, 340, 24 N. E.2d 694, 698
(1940) (court indicating that subsequent artisan lienholder could find previous mortgage
through certificate of title) ; Nelson v. Fisch, 39 N. W.2d 594 (Iowa 1949) (seller who
retained possession of certificate prevailed over Iowa purchaser) ; Eline v. Commercial
Credit Corp., 307 Ky. 77, 209 S. W.2d 846 (1948) (conditional seller's interest registered
on Indiana certificate of title filed with county clerk in Kentucky) ; Chandler v. Conabeer,
198 N. C. 757, 153 S. E. 313 (1930) (subsequent purchaser informed that first lienholder
held certificate of title). But cf. Taplinger v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 101 F.2d 274
(3d Cir. 1939) (applying peculiar and criticized interpretation by Pennsylvania inferior
courts of statute now repealed) ; Security Nat. Bank v. Bell, 125 N. J. L. 640, 17 A.2d
552 (Err. & App. 1941). In states where the statute clearly requires liens upon the cer-
tificate to be registered, and manifests an intent to protect third persons, the lien is held
effective without local filing or recording. Van Syckle v. Keats, 125 N. J. L. 319, 15
A.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. 1940) ; see C. I. T. Corp. v. Guy, 170 Va. 16, 195 S. E. 659, 662 (1938).
12. Investigation reveals that most automobile dealers rely entirely upon the status
of the title certificates in buying and trading in used automobiles. Of the dealers ex-
amined, none admitted to a practice of examining the county chattel mortgage records
to determine the existence of liens upon the motor vehicles acquired.
13. In general see 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5201 et seq. (3d ed.,
Horack, 1943).
14. Clf. Christian v. Boyd, 222 S. W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) ; Merchants Rating
& Adjusting Co. v. Skaug, 4 Wash.2d 46, 102 P.2d 227 (1940). Contra: Carolina Dis-
count Corp. v. Landis Motor Co., 190 N. C. 157, 129 S. E. 414 (1925).
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Serious difficulties may arise where the chattel mortgagee's interest is
not perfected through the procedure of recording with the Bureau and a re-
issue of the certificate showing the lien. Should the mortgagee permit the
debtor to retain possession of the motor vehicle and the certificate of title,
under the chattel mortgage act the mortgage would be invalid as against the
claims of subsequent purchasers and creditors without actual notice.15 Un-
fortunately, the title certificate statute fails to designate the third persons 8
who may claim an estoppel against the lienholder because of the latter's failure
to perfect his security interest, but it is reasonable to assume that they are
the same as those protected by the Chattel Mortgage Act.
Where the mortgagee retains possession of the title certificate, or causes
his lien to be stamped or written on the certificate without recording through
the procedure of reissue,'17 a third person purchasing the vehicle would be
15. See note 10 supra.
16. The Indiana title certificate law provides that the records of the Bureau shall be
open to the public, and for a fee a copy of any record of the department will be furnished
on request. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Supp. 1949) § 47-2408. The title certificates are
indexed under the engine number of the vehicle, and consequently third persons desiring
to determine the owner's status must ascertain the engine number from the certificate
of registration.
17. It will be observed that the lienholder's interest may serve as notice to the public
through dealings with the certificate of title in at'least four situations: (1) The lien
may be written on the title, and the title then processed through the department by assign-
ment or reissue. In this case the lien becomes a matter of public record. (2) The lien-
holder may merely retain possession of the title certificate. The lien is thus not made
a matter of public record, except insofar as persons dealing with the title are charged
with notice that the lien debtor does not have possession of it. E.g., Associates Discount
Corp. v. Hardesty, 122 F.2d 18 (App. D. C. 1941) (lienholder financing dealer kept cer-
tificate of origin) ; It re Soss, 52 F. Supp. 123 (D. Del. 1.943) (debtor pledged certificate
of title) ; Buss v. McKee, 115 Colo. 159, 170 P.2d 268 (1946); Nelson v. Fisch, 39
N. W.2d 594 (Iowa 1949) (seller attached certificate of title to buyer's check, so that
buyer could obtain title only after check cleared) ; Colonial Finance Co. v. Hunt, 290 Ky.
299, 160 S. W.2d 591 (1942) (lienholder financing dealer kept certificate of origin);
Chandler v. Conabeer, 198 N. C. 757, 153 S. E. 313 (1930) (mortgagee retained certificate
of title) ; General Credit Corp. v. Lee James, Inc., 8 IWash.2d 185, 111 P.2d 762 (1941)
(assignee of mortgagee took certificate showing original lien) ; cf. Superior Finance Co.
v. American Security Co., 107 Ind. App. 461, 25 N. E.2d 256 (1940) (assignee of condi-
tional sales contract took title certificate in name of original seller, but relinquished pos-
session to buyer). (3) The lien may be written, stamped, or otherwise fastened to the
certificate of title, in which case the lien is not a public record, except as third persons-
are charged with the duty of dealing with the certificate. E.g., Superior Finance Co. v.
American Security Co., 107 Ind. App. 461, 25 N. E.2d 256 (1940) (certificate of title
delivered to buyer, but rider attached to certificate showing conditional sale); Eline v.
Commercial Credit Corp., 307 Ky. 77, 209 S. W.2d 846 (1948) (lien not perfected by
reissue, but shown on title) ; Ross v. Leuci, 194 Misc. 345, 85 N. Y. S.2d 497 (N. Y. City
Ct. 1949) (owner signed transfer blank on back of certificate and entrusted instrument
to swindler). (4) The lienholder may cause the title to be assigned to him, or may refuse
to assign the title in the case of a conditional sale. Here the lienholder's possible claim
appears upon the records of the department for the reason that nothing on the records
shows that the lien debtor has title. Cf. International Harvester Co. v. Holley, 106 Ind.
App. 329, 18 N. E.2d 484 (1939) (conditional seller who perfected his lien upon the title
certificate prevailed against subsequent execution creditor); Commercial Credit Co. v.
McNelly, 6 Harr. 88, 171 Atl. 446' (Del. Super. Ct. 1934) (owner who held certificate
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charged with notice of a defect in the mortgagor's title by his failure to
produce the certificate for assignment, or where the lien appears in writing
on the instrument by the actual notice imparted thereby. Consequently a good
argument is present for protecting the lienholder against a purchaser in such
circumstances.' 8 The situation is further complicated by the relative ease
with which a last certificate may be replaced, and fraudulent application is
not effectively prevented. 9 The new certificate vests the mortgagor with
apparent ownership, and bona fide purchasers taking an assignment of the
certificate should be protected, since the mortgagee could have recorded his
lien with the Bureau through the process of reissue. 20 Where creditors of the
mortgagor are involved the issue becomes more difficult because there are
no public records from which subsequent creditors can ascertain the lien-
turned possession of automobile over to agent at used car market). The practice whereby
the lienholder retains or causes the title certificate to be registered in his own name is un-
desirable because the certificate constitutes evidence of ownership, and thus may imperil
the real owner's right. Cf. Automobile Underwriters v. Tite, 85 N. E.2d 365 (Ind. App.
1949); Greaf v. Breitenstein, 97 Ind. App. 525, 187 N. E. 347 (1933) ; Meskiman v.
Adams, 83 Ind. App. 447, 149'N. E. 93 (1925); Coffey v. Williams, 69 Ariz. 126, 210
P.2d 959 (1949) (where only written evidence of security consisted of certificate of title
in lienholder's name) ; Majors v. Majors, 349 Pa. 334, 37 A.2d 528 (1944) (evidence
insufficient to show W was owner of automobile where certificate taken in name of H,
although W furnished the consideration).
In some states failure to comply with the title certificate law invalidates the
transfer. E.g., Scarborough v. Detroit Operating Co., 256 Mich. 173, 239 N. W.
344 (1931) (where certificate not transferred to conditional buyer, conditional seller
could not enforce contract); Peper v. American Exchange Nat. Bank, 357 Mo. 652,
210 S. W.2d 41 (1948) (lienholder took certificate improperly acknowledged). But
cf. Janney v. Bell, 111 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1940). The effect of dealings with the
title certificate should not be confused with statutes requiring registration for pur-
pose of taxation and identification plates. Such legislation is not intended to impart
notice of liens and ownership to third persons. Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Willey, 237
Iowa 1250, 24 N. W.2d 796 (1946) ; Kurtz v. Adrian, 46 S. D. 125, 191 N. XW. 188 (1922)
(license registration in name of mortgagee). But cf. Personal Finance Co. v. Flecknoe,
216 Ind. 330, 340, 24 N. E.2d 694, 698 (1940) (subsequent artisan's lienholder charged
with notice of ownership through possibility of checking registration card); Security
Nat. Bank v. Bell, 125 N. J. L. 640, 17 A.2d 552 (Err. & App. 1941) (debtor retained
registration plates in own name, though certificate of title showed lien).
18. Cf. International Harvester Co. v. Holley, 106 Ind. App. 329, 18 N. E.2d 484
(1939) (conditional seller prevailed over subsequent execution lienholder); Nelson v.
Fisch, 39 N. W.2d 594 (Iowa 1949) ; Eline v. Commercial Credit Corp., 307 Ky. 77, 209
S. W.2d 846 (1948) (lien of Indiana seller written on title prevailed against purchaser
in Kentucky who could have found lien on Kentucky records) ; Chandler v. Conabeer,
198 N. C. 757, 153 S. E. 313 (1930). But cf. It re Soss, 52 F. Supp. 123 (D. Del. 1943);
Christian v. Boyd, 222 S. W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
19. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Supp. 1949) § 47-2512. Since the statute requires the
Bureau to mark the replaced certificate with the word "duplicate," the argument might be
raised that all subsequent purchasers are to be charged with the uncertain character of
the instrument.
20. Cf. Motor Inv. Co. v. Knox City, 141 Tex. 530, 174 S. W.2d 482 (1943) ; General
Credit Corp. v. Lee James, Inc., 8 Wash.2d 185, 111 P.2d 762 (1941). The power of the
debtor to obtain a new certificate is comparable to the situation where an owner or
lienholder puts the debtor or another in a position of holding apparent authority to dis-
pose of the property. E.g., Ross v. Leuci, 194 Misc. 345, 85 N. Y. S.2d 497 (N. Y. City
.NOTES
holder's interest.21  As a practical matter, however, the creditor who loans
upon the debtor's balance sheet can require the debtor to verify his ownership
of motor vehicles by producing the title certificate. On the other hand, the
chattel mortgage records provide a valuable source of credit information to
the large credit agencies, and an argument can be made that creditors should
be permitted to rely upon the public records.
22
Filed chattel mortgage
Because the Chattel -Mortgage Act and the title certificate law seemingly
provide for different methods of imparting notice of security interests in
motor vehicles, the odd situation often arises, as it did in the Crissinger case,
that the chattel mortgage is filed, but the lien is not perfected through the
certificate of title.22  This demonstrates forcefully a very real dilemma facing
a prospective buyer or lender who loans on the security of motor vehicles.
The alleged owner may present an unencumbered certificate of title, yet the
lender or buyer is forced to withhold action until he has searched the chattel
Ct. 1949) (auto turned over to agent with assignment blanks on title certificate signed
by owner). A thief who obtains possession of a certificate of title assigned in blank
cannot pass good title. Adkisson v. Waitman, 213 P.2d 465 (Okla. 1949). Nor will a
person who accepts title with knowledge of the facts be protected. Sax Motor Co. v.
Mann, 71 N. D. 221, 299 N. W. 691 (1941).
21. There may be danger that the lien could be cut off by a bona fide purchaser, thus
constituting a preference in bankruptcy. 52 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 96 (1946) ;
Corn Exchange Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U. S. 434 (1943) ; In re Soss, 52
F. Supp. 123 (D. Del. 1943) (pledgee of title certificate held an equitable lien, and
therefore the lien constituted a preference).
22. Consultation with several of the larger credit investigating agencies (Retailers
Commercial Agency Inc., Dun & Bradstreet Inc., etc.) reveals that regular and current
information from the chattel mortgage records is transcribed from all of the chattel
mortgage records of the state. This information is forwarded to the central office of
the credit agencies where it is indexed and classified to provide a valuable source of credit
information to subscribers of the service furnished by the agencies. Since the motor
vehicle mortgage is the largest single class of property from which this credit information
is obtained, a source of credit information might be destroyed if means were not provided
for public recordation of all such liens. It is submitted, however, that if all liens upon
motor vehicles were recorded with the Bureau of Motor Vehicles the efficiency of the
credit investigating agencies would be increased, because the records would show in addi-
tion to chattel mortgages those liens held by way of conditional sale. In addition the
geographical distribution of the task of investigating local records would be reduced
by the corresponding reduction of the number of liens filed in the local records.
23. This same dilemma has commonly faced bankers and automobile lienholders in
other states. Cf. Buss v. McKee, 115 Colo. 159, 170 P.2d 268 (1946); Sorensen v.
Pagenkopf, 151 Kan. 913, 101 P.2d 928 (1940) ; Associates Discount Corp. v. Davis Motor
Sales, 275 App. Div. 745, 87 N. Y. S.2d 757 (4th Dep't 1949) ; First National Bank v.
Sheldon, 161 Pa. Super. 265, 54 A.2d 61 (1947) ; Motor Inv. Co. v. Knox City, 141 Tex.
530, 174 S. W.2d 482 (1943); Higgins v. Robertson, 210 S. W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948) ; Merchants Rating & Adjusting Co. v. Skaug, 4 Wash.2d 46, 102 P.2d 227 (1940).
In some states the statutes compromise the political demand for local recording with the
title certificate law by requiring the lien to be filed with the county officer who is required
to certify or note the lien on the title. E.g., Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. (Cum. Supp. 1944)
§ 3488; Butler County Finance Co. v. Miller, 225 S. W.2d 135 (Mo. App. 1949).
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mortgage records of the proper county, unless he is permitted to rely upon the
certificate of title. To the banker and to the business man this is a real
hardship.24 Sales may be delayed; the cost of making the loan is increased;
and the lender is put to the task of ascertaining not only the residence of the
borrower,25 but previous owners as well.2 6  Here, as elsewhere, the courts
should strain for a legal solution in conformity with commercial reality.
As previously suggested, the Supreme Court should be justified in con-
struing the two statutes together.2 7  Since the title certificate law purports to
cover a particular type of property insofar as the method of imparting notice
to third persons is concerned, it is fair to assume that this statute was intended
to supercede the chattel mortgage law to the extent that third persons may
24. See note 12 supra.
25. The difficulty of ascertaining the borrower's residence is demonstrated by Berg-
man v. Columbia Securities Co., 84 Ind. App. 403, 151 N. E. 367 (1926). There the
certificate owner of a motor vehicle who was employed in Marion County and gave as his
address a place in that county gave a chattel mortgage to a Marion County lending agency.
The borrower, however, was in fact a resident of Hamilton County. The court held that
the mortgage which was recorded in Marion County was invalid as against a third person
who obtained possession and a certificate of title as a result of judicial proceedings estab-
lishing a prior equitable right to the vehicle.
26. Cf. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Collinsworth, 288 Ky. 398, 156 S. W.2d 157 (1941);
Associates Discount Corp. v. Davis Motor Sales, 275 App. Div. 745, 87 N. Y. S.2d 757
(4th Dep't 1949) (where automobile sold on recorded conditional sale to H, but certificate
of title taken in the name of W, held that assignee of seller's contract prevailed over bona
fide purchaser from W who perfected his interest through the title certificate). But cf.
Rigney v. Swingley, 112 Mont. 104, 113 P.2d 344 (1941) (mortgage from owner whose
interest did not appear in the chain of title on the title certificate cut off by bona fide
purchaser) ; Majors v. Majors, 349 Pa. 334, 37 A.2d 528 (1944) (execution creditor pre-
vailed over owner who claimed prior right which was not perfected on certificate of title).
Dispute as to ownership of motor vehicles very commonly arises where a defrauded seller
asserts rights to the property. As a general rule a voidable title is cut off where property
comes into the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value. Patterson v. Indiana Invest-
ment & Securities Co., 75 Ind. App. 489, 131 N. E. 19 (1921) (seller who delivered auto-
mobile on bad check of buyer cut off by bona fide purchaser who relied upon bill of sale) ;
UNIroR1 SALES ACT, 1 U. L. A. § 24 (1950); IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Repl.
1943) § 58-208. In settling the rights between the defrauded seller and purchasers of the
buyer the courts have been surprisingly astute in examining the customs of the trade re-
lating to the certificate of title for purposes of determining good faith. Dresher v. Roy
Wilmeth Co., 118 Ind. App. 542, 82 N. E.2d 260 (1948) (purchaser from buyer who gave
bad check and fictitious name protected on the ground that purchaser received certificate
of title in buyer's fictitious name) ; Shockley v. Hill, 91 Colo. 451, 15 P.2d 623 (1932)
(purchaser from fraudulent buyer protected because purchaser obtained certificate of
title) ; Nelson v. Fisch, 39 N. W.2d 594 (Iowa 1949) (purchaser from fraudulent buyer
did not prevail against defrauded seller who attached certificate of title to bad check) ;
Sims v. Sugg, 165 Kan. 489, 196 P.2d 191 (1948) (purchaser from fraudulent buyer
did not prevail because purchaser failed to get certificate of title) ; Ross v. Leuci, 194
Misc. 345, 85 N. Y. S.2d 497 (N. Y. City Ct. 1949) (purchaser from fraudulent buyer
prevailed on the ground that purchaser obtained certificate of title) ; cf. Craig Brokerage
Co. v. Joseph A. Goodard Co., 92 Ind. App. 234, 175 N. E. 19 (1931) (subsequent pur-
chaser of canned goods left in the possession of the seller charged with notice of rights
of a previous purchaser because the latter's labels were placed upon the cans).
27. See notes 13 and 14 supra.
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rely upon the status of the certificate of title." ' Persons dealing with motor
vehicles would thus be permitted to rely upon the certificate of title, without
regard to the chattel mortgage records.2 9
The validity of this reasoning was sustained by Nichols v. Bogda Motors,
Inc.,30 a recent appellate court decision refusing to sustain a Michigan
mortgage on an automobile sold by the borrower to a bona fide purchaser in
Indiana. Although the mortgage was duly filed in the chattel mortgage
records in Michigan, the court refused to charge the Indiana purchaser with
constructive notice of the lien because the lien was not perfected upon the
certificate of title. The court therefore refused to recognize the previous
mortgage because it violated an "established policy of this state and universally
recognized principles of equity."'" The Crissinger case, however, is a com-
plete reversal of the policy unless it can be distinguished on the basis that
possession of the title certificate was given up for a temporary purpose.3 2
Assuming that the indicia of ownership were incorporated in the certificate
of title, the fact situation bears close analogy to the so-called equitable pledge,
since possession was relinquished for a "temporary and limited purpose."3 3
But in no Indiana case has an equitable pledge been upheld as against a bona
fide purchaser.3 4 It is the universal rule-that the bona fide purchaser will cut
28. This result has been reached without finding an implied repeal of the local re-
cording laws, but by broadening the requisites of a "good faith" purchaser. Merchants
Rating & Adjusting Co. v. Skaug, 4 Wash.2d 46, 102 P.2d 227 (1940) (subsequent pur-
chaser from mortgagor who obtained certificate of title prevailed over lien of prior mort-
gagee properly filed in the local records) ; cf. Sorensen v. Pagenkopf, 151 Kan. 913, 101
P.2d 928 (1940).
29. A subsequent purchaser who examines and finds a prior mortgage upon the
county records, would probably be charged with actual notice of the lien. Cf. Walter v.
Hartwig, 106 Ind. 123, 6 N. E. 5 (1886) (purchaser who saw imperfectly recorded in-
strument in real estate records charged with actual notice of the transaction).
30. 118 Ind. App. 156, 77 N. E.2d 905 (1948).
31. Id. at 161, 77 N. E.2d at 908; cf. First National Bank v. Sheldon, 161 Pa. Super.
265, 54 A.2d 61 (1947).
32. Community State Bank v. Crissinger, 89 N. E.2d 78, 80 (Ind. App. 1949):
. . . in this case the bank did take up the certificates. They were
relinquished to the borrower for a legitimate purpose, and without
knowledge on the part of the bank that they would be used for the
purpose of accomplishing a fraud. The bank made reasonable efforts
to recover them. In the absence of a statute requiring the bank to take
up and hold them, we must conclude that the court erred in holding
that Bobbs' title was not subject to the lien of the mortgages.
33. Cf. 2 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 490 (Rev. ed. 1940);
Fletcher American Nat. Bank v. Federal Securities Co., 94 Ind. App. 379, 169 N. E. 599
(1929).
34. Cf. Fletcher American Nat. Bank v. Fed. Securities Co., 94 Ind. App. 379, 169
N. E. 599 (1929); New Albany Nat. Bank v. Brown, 63 Ind. App. 391, 114 N. E. 486
(1916).
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off the rights of such pledgee. 5 The Uniform Trust Receipts Act 36 recog-
nizes the validity of the equitable pledge for some purposes as against general
creditors, and common law decisions will bear out this result.3 T It is likely,
therefore, that the court may have confused the rights of creditors with those
of bona fide purchasers.
Conditional sale
Because Indiana has not adopted filing or recording provisions generally
applicable to conditional sales, the conditional seller normally is protected as
against all third persons,8 with the exception of purchasers in the regular
course of trade.3 " The precise effect of the title certificate law upon these
principles has not been conclusively settled by court decisions. But it has
been held that the conditional seller may estop himself as against third persons
where the title certificate is assigned to the buyer without showing the
encumbrance.4" This seems justified, since the title certificate law clearly
authorizes the conditional sellers lien to be perfected through the title certifi-
35. RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 11, comment c (1941); cf. Canal-Commercial Trust
& Say. Bank v. New Orleans, T. & M. Ry., 161 La. 1051, 109 So. 834 (1926).
36. UNIFORmt TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 3; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Supp. 1949) § 51-603
(recognizing that a pledge not accompanied by possession may be valid for 10 days from
the time new value is given by the pledgee). Bona fide purchasers from the pledgor,
however, are protected by the express terms of the section.
37. Clark v. Iselin, 88 U. S. 360 (1874) ; cf. Fletcher American Nat. Bank v. Mc-
Dermid, 76 Ind. App. 150, 128 N. E. 685 (1920).
38. The filing provisions of the UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT (with the excep-
tions of railroad rolling stock and fixtures) were eliminated from the statute as adopted
by Indiana. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1943 Repl.) §§ 58-801, 58-829. Cf. Abels v.
National Bond & Inv. Co., 105 Ind. App. 434, 13 N. E.2d 903 (1938).
39. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1943 Repl.) § 58-808; Lett v. Eastern Moline
Plow Co., 46 Ind. App. 56, 91 N. E. 978 (1910) ; cf. Andre v. Murray, 179 Ind. 576, 101
N. E. 81 (1913). However, borrower and lender cannot make a conditional sale out of
a transaction where there is no bona fide sale. Federal Building Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,
101 Ind. App. 286, 199 N. E. 163 (1936) (automobiles received by dealer financed under
sham arrangement whereby lending institution took bill of sale and purported to resell on
conditional sale to dealer).
40. Superior Finance Co. v. American Security Co., 107 Ind. App. 461, 25 N. E.2d
256 (1940). Other cases have protected the bona fide purchaser receiving an un-
encumbered certificate of title, but in each case the purchase was made in the regular
course of business from a dealer. LaPorte Discount Corp. v. Bessinger, 91 Ind. App. 635,
171 N. E. 323 (1930) ; Guaranty Discount Corp. v. Bowers, 94 Ind. App. 373, 158 N. E.
231 (1932). But cf. Abels v. National Bond & Inv. Co., 105 Ind. App. 434, 13 N. E.2d
903 (1938) (assignee of conditional sales contract made to dealer prevailed over subse-
quent purchaser who was also a dealer although title certificate passed to latter). Where
the conditional seller perfects his lien upon the certificate he is protected as against third
persons. International Harvester Co. v. Holley, 106 Ind. App. 329, 18 N. E.2d 484
(1939) ; cf. Eline v. Commercial Credit Corp., 307 Ky. 77, 209 S. W.2d 846 (1948). The
various means by which the creditor can perfect his lien upon the title certificate are dis-
cussed in note 17 supra. As to the rights of the conditional buyer's creditors where lien
of the seller is not perfected compare West v. Fulling, 36 Ind. App. 617, 76 N. E. 325
(1905) (creditors of buyer, who was a dealer in merchandise, covered by conditional sale,
prevailed over seller) with Andre v. Murray, 179 Ind. 576, 101 N. E. 81 (1913) (holding
to the contrary).
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cate.41 Although business men recognize sound reasons for dispensing with
filing or recording because of nuisance expense,42 especially in the case of
small consumer sales, the sale of motor vehicles normally involves substantial
sums of money. The opportunity for central recordation creates no burden
since an assignment of the certificate from buyer to seller is required in any
event.43 Hence the only disadvantage to the seller is that he would be required
to fill in the space upon the certificate provided for showing of encumbrances.
Pledge or other special lien
Because possession serves as constructive notice of security interests,
44
a pledgee or lienholder who obtains possession of a motor vehicle should be
protected as against creditors and subsequent purchasers irrespective of the
status of the title certificate.43 Persons claiming other common law or
statutory possessory liens46 should, likewise, be accorded the same protection.
4 7
In Indiana the statute giving a lien to one who has furnished repairs to motor
vehicles provides that the mechanic may file his lien in the miscellaneous
records of the county in which the work was done,48 thus inferring that the
lien continues after filing although possession be returned to the owners. 9
41. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Supp. 1949) § 47-2501; cf. Security Nat. Bank v. Bell,
125 N. J. L. 640, 17 A.2d 552 (Err. & App. 1941) (statute requiring bill of sale to be
registered with the Motor Vehicle Department applies to conditional sales, and not
mortgages).
42. Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Proposed Final Draft, Spring 1950) § 9-303
(excepting liens upon consumer and other goods from the filing provisions of the Code,
but apparently including motor vehicles).
43. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Supp. 1949) § 47-2501.
44. Cf. Franklin Nat. Bank v. Whitehead, 149 Ind. 560, 49 N. E. 592 (1898).
45. Dennis v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n., 34 Cal. App.2d 618,
94 P.2d 51 (1939); Peper v. American Exchange Nat. Bank, 205 S. W.2d 215 (Mo. App.
1947), rcz'd in part, 357 Mo. 652, 210 S. W.2d 41 (1948) (dealer obtained loan upon
security of certificate of title to vehicle which had been delivered to a buyer) ; Motor Inv.
Co. v. Knox City, 141 Tex. 530, 174 S. W.2d 482, 487 (1943) (possession of buyer suf-
ficient to charge subsequent lienholder perfecting lien upon title) ; cf. San Joaquin Valley
Securities Co. v. Prather, 123 Cal. App. 378, 11 P.2d 45 (1932) ; Colorado State Bank v.
Riede, 92 Colo. 362, 20 P.2d 1010 (1933). The mortgagee or lienholder who properly
obtains possession for purposes of foreclosure or protecting his interests prevails as against
creditors and subsequent purchasers. Janney v. Bell, 111 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1940). How-
ever a mortgage taken with a design toward obtaining possession may violate the bulk
sales statutes, and therefore be in fraud of creditors. Van Camp Hardware & Iron Co.
v. Ellis, 209 Ind. 582, 198 N. E. 75 (1935). For procedure whereby the interest of the
buyer at judicial or foreclosure sale is perfected upon the certificate see IND. STAT. ANN.
(Burns Supp. 1949) § 47-2505.
46. For the various types of such liens see RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 61 (1941).
47. See Elder Chevrolet Co. v. Bailey County Motor Co., 151 S. W.2d 938, 942 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1941).
48. IND. STAT. ANN. (Bums Supp. 1949) §§ 43-809, 43-810.
49. No cases were found holding that the lien continues after the artisan returns
possession to the owner. Cf. Lincoln Finance Corp. v. Morgan, 90 N. E.2d 522 (Ind.
App. 1950) (mortgagee made both artisan lienholder and mortgagor parties in replevin
action).
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This may create an intolerable situation because third persons would be
required to search the records of all the ninety-two counties in the state. This
may be avoided by requiring the artisan to perfect his lien upon the certificate
of title before relinquishing possession."
Dealer Financing
The title certificate normally does not play an important role in dealer
financing of motor vehicles because the dealer is entrusted with the title on
the supposition that the property will be sold in the course of trade. It is
generally recognized that a buyer in the regular course of trade will be
protected as against a person claiming a lien upon a stock of merchandise.51
In conformity with that principle the decisions protect the buyer who receives
an unencumbered certificate of title from the dealer as against a financer
claiming a lien upon the vehicle."2 The most difficulty arises where the
buyer in regular course of business fails to obtain an unencumbered certificate
of title, as where the financer keeps the certificate of title or certificate of
origin, or -otherwise perfects his lien thereon. In this case it is doubtful that
the lienholder should be protected because the circumstances create an ap-
parent authority in the dealer to make the sale, and it would seem unreasonable
to subject the buyer to the lienholder's rights in the absence of actual knowl-
50. Related to this problem is the dispute which may arise between a person holding
a lien upon accessories and a subsequent lienholder claiming a lien upon the vehicle. Cf.
Goodrich Silvertown Stores v. Brashear Freight Lines, 198 S. W.2d 357 (Mo. App. 1946)
(mortgagee holding lien upon tires which was filed in local records prevailed over sub-
sequent purchaser who obtained perfected title certificate). The Indiana artisan's lien
law applies to accessories "furnished in connection with the repair, storage, servicing or
maintenance of any such motor vehicle .... ." IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Supp. 1949) §
43-807. That the lien should be perfected upon the title certificate is supported by analogy
to the law of fixtures. E.g., IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1943 Repl.) § 58-806 (con-
ditional sale of fixtures must be recorded in deed records to protect seller from subsequent
purchasers of real estate from buyer).
51. E.g., Helms v. American Security Co., 216 Ind. 1, 22 N. E.2d 822 (1939) ; Indiana
Inv. & Sec. Co. v. Whisman, 85 Ind. App. 109, 138 N. E. 512 (1923); Finance Corp. of
New Jersey v. Jones, 98 N. J. L. 165, 119 Atl. 171 (1922). A dealer who purchases from
a dealer is not a buyer in the regular course of trade. Abels v. National Bond & Inv.
Co., 105 Ind. App. 434, 13 N. E.2d 903 (1938) ; cf. Lett v. Eastern Moline Plow Co., 46
Ind. App. 56, 91 N. E. 978 (1910). Nor is a subsequent mortgagee lending to the dealer.
Cf. Morberg v. Commercial Credit Corp., CCH CONDITIONAL SALE & CHATTEL MORTGAGE
REP. para. 12,249 (Minn. March 31, 1950) ; Haugen v. Neiswonger, 209 P.2d 267 (Wash.
1949). But cf. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Dassenko, CCH CONDITIONAL SALE & CHAT-
TEL MORTGAGE REP. para. 12,250 (N. D. March 25, 1950).
52. LaPorte Discount Corp. v. Bessinger, 91 Ind. App. 635, 171 N. E. 323 (1930);
Guaranty Discount Corp. v. Bowers, 94 Ind. App. 373, 158 N. E. 231 (1932) ; Sorensen
v. Pagenkopf, 151 Kan. 913, 101 P.2d 928 (1940); Tyler State Bank & Trust Co. v.
Monaville Independent School Dist., 226 S. W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) ; cf. Ross
v. Leuci, 194 Misc. 345, 85 N. Y. S.2d 497 (N. Y. City Ct. 1949). Compare also the cases
cited in note 51 supra.
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edge of the lien and lack of power in the dealer to sell in such a manner.58
This conclusion is supported by the realities of the dealer-consumer relation
whereby the buyer more often than not trusts the dealer to manage the paper
work necessary for perfecting the buyer's title. Furthermore, since other
legal devices for financing the dealer 4 are provided and commonly practiced,
there is no reason for charging the consumer public with the technical niceties
of the title certificate law when dealing with those charged with the skills
of the trade.
Assignment of lienholder's interest
The Indiana title certificate law does not provide a satisfactory method
whereby the assignee of the lienholder can perfect or record his lien upon
the certificate of title. However the assignee can require the assignor to
deliver possession of the certificate showing the lien thereon, thus providing
sufficient protection against third persons. 55 An admitted weakness in this
transaction occurs where the assignor and lien-debtor fraudulently obtain a
duplicate by claiming to have lost the original title certificate, and the new
title certificate is then transferred to a bona fide purchaser. " Yet this
danger is not real for several reasons. Most assignments in the field of
automobile financing are made from dealer to financing company as the
result of retail sales. Consequently the assignee has confidence in a dealer
53. Associates Discount Corp. v. Hardesty, 122 F.2d 18 (App. D. C. 1941) ; Tharp v.
San Joaquin Valley Securities Co., 20 Cal. App.2d 20, 66 P.2d 230 (1937) ; Western
States Acceptance Corp. v. Bank of Italy, 104 Cal. App. 19, 285 Pac. 340 (1930) ; Colorado
State Bank v. Riede, 92 Colo. 361, 20 P.2d 1010 (1933) (title certificate law excepted
new sales) ; Commercial Credit Co. v. McNelly, 6 Harr. 88, 171 Atl. 446 (Del. Super. Ct.
1934) (owner delivered automobile to used car market where auto was sold to bona fide
purchaser) ; L. B. Motors, Inc. v. Prichard, 303 Ill. App. 318, 25 N. E.2d 129 (1940) ;
Buttinghausen v. Rappeport, 131 N. J. Eq. 252, 25 A.2d 877 (Ch. 1942) ; Owen v. Miller,
190 Okla. 205, 122 P.2d 140 (1942) ; cf. Peper v. American Exchange Nat. Bank, 357 Mo.
652, 210 S. W.2d 41 (1948) ; Automobile Finance Co. v. Munday, 137 Ohio St. 504, 30
N. E.2d 1002 (1940). Contra: Colonial Finance Co. v. Hunt, 290 Ky. 299, 160 S. W.2d
591 (1942) (strictly applying Ohio law). The lien, however, may be valid as against
creditors. Universal Credit Co. v. M. C. Gale, Inc., 40 Cal. App.2d 796, 105 P.2d 1003
(1940) ; Universal Credit Co. v. Botetourt Motor Co., 180 Va. 159, 21 S. E.2d 800 (1942)
(lienholder retaining title certificate excepted from Virginia "Traders Act").
54. The title certificate law should not be construed to supercede the statutory
methods provided for trust receipts financing. Universal Credit Co. v. M. C. Gale, Inc.,
40 Cal. App.2d 796, 105 P.2d 1003 (1940); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Horan, 325 Ill.
App. 625, 60 N. E.2d 763 (1945).
55. As to the various methods by which the lien may be perfected through the title
certificate see note 17 supra.
56. General Credit Corp. v. Lee James, Inc., 8 Wasb.2d 185, 111 P.2d 762 (1941);
accord, Buss v. McKee, 115 Colo. 159, 170 P.2d 268 (1946) (where buyer induced dealer-
seller to give dealer's certificate to third person, although dealer-seller knew that buyer
had given a prior mortgage, held that mortgagee could recover damages from dealer-seller
on the ground that the third person prevailed). But cf. Motor Investment Co. v. Knox
City, 141 Tex. 530, 174 S. W.2d 482 (1943) (assignee by subrogation who obtained re-
placement of manufacturer's title did not prevail over intervening purchaser in possession).
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with whom the financing company regularly does business. Again, the lien
ordinarily secures negotiable paper, with the result that a lien-debtor is
charged with notice that payments must be made to the holder of the negotiable
instrument.5 7  This also eliminates the expense and trouble of perfecting an
assignment upon records. Recent decisions establish a not uncommon hazard
to the finance company taking assignments of liens held by an automobile
dealer, who has sold the vehicle to an employee on conditional sale or on sale
with chattel mortgage back as a sham transaction for obtaining credit through
the discount method. The conditional sale or mortgage is then discounted
with a lending institution, thus enabling the dealer to obtain credit upon his
stock in trade by a device which conceals its real purpose. Where the assignee
fails to obtain the title certificate, a subsequent buyer in the ordinary course
of business is protected as against the claims of the assignee. 8 But where
the assignee has obtained the certificate of title the subsequent buyer and the
assignee may both be innocent parties. Several well reasoned decisions, how-
ever, charge the assignee with liabilities of a dealer-financer upon the basis
that the finance company is informed of the customs of the trade. 9 Conse-
quently, the buyer in the course of trade should be protected where he has no
actual knowledge of the assignment.
Conclusion
The direct result of the Crissinger decision will force conservative
lenders and buyers to examine both the chattel mortgage records and the
status of the certificate of title before loaning money upon the security of,
or before purchasing motor vehicles. Conversely, this means that the
conservative bank or lender will cause all liens upon motor vehicles to be
perfected in the county chattel mortgage records and upon the certificate
of title as well. On the other hand the business man, who deals in a com-
petitive market, and others who are bound by the customs of the trade may
continue to rely upon the notice imparted by the certificate of title without
regard to the ninety-two sets of chattel mortgage records in the state. The
convenience of this practice will, undoubtedly, justify the risk. Therefore,
57. Third persons who deal with the property, however, may rely upon the status of
the public records. Cf. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Talbot, 113 Ind. 373, 14 N. E.
586 (1887) (purchaser from mortgagor prevailed where records showed that mortgage
was released by mortgagee although mortgagee had previously assigned mortgage and
note securing it).
58. LaPorte Discount Corp. v. Bessinger, 91 Ind. App. 635, 171 N. E. 323 (1930);
Guaranty Discount Corp. v. Bowers, 94 Ind. App. 373, 158 N. E. 231 (1932) ; Parke v.
Franciscus, 194 Cal. 284, 228 Pac. 435 (1924).
59. Sorensen v. Pagenkopf, 151 Kan. 913, 101 P.2d 928 (1940) ; cf. Guaranty Dis-
count Corp. v. Bowers, 94 Ind. App. 373, 158 N. E. 231 (1932). See cases cited note 53
supra.
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it is not unreasonable to suggest that future decisions upon this problem
reserve space to consider the customs, usages and needs of the trade.6 0
60. That the practical realities of the trade will determine the policy of the common
law and statutory rules governing the rights of lienholders compare Kruger v. Wilcox,
1 Amb. 252, 27 Eng. Rep. 168 (Ch. 1755) with Helms v. American Security Co., 216 Ind.
1, 22 N. E.2d 822 (1939).
